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REDUCING MOMMY PENALTIES WITH DADDY QUOTAS* 
Allison Dunatchik1 and Berkay Özcan2 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether daddy quotas - non-transferable paternity leave policies - 
mitigate motherhood penalties women face in the labor market. Using the introduction of a 
daddy quota in Quebec, Canada as a natural experiment, we employ labor force survey data to 
conduct a difference-in-difference estimation of the policy’s impact on a range of mothers’ 
career outcomes, using mothers in the neighboring province of Ontario as a comparison group. 
The results suggest Quebec mothers exposed to the policy are 5 percentage points more likely to 
participate in the labor force and to work full-time, 5 percentage points less likely to work part-
time, and 4 percentage points less likely to be unemployed than they would have been in the 
absence of the policy. Our results are robust to an alternative semi-parametric difference-
indifference methodology and to a battery of placebo and sensitivity tests. However, we find that 
the policy’s effects are largest two to three years post-reform, reducing in size and significance 
thereafter, raising questions about the durability of such effects.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The literature on gender gaps in women’s labor market outcomes broadly acknowledges 
‘motherhood penalties’ at work in depressing women’s labor market attachment, wages and 
occupational mobility relative to men’s outcomes. Such penalties are driven, at least in part, by 
unequal divisions of unpaid care work between men and women and by women’s career 
interruptions around the birth of children (Bianchi, 2011; Bianchi et al., 2012, Budig et al., 2012; 
Harkness & Waldfogel, 2003; Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel, 2007). Across OECD countries, 
mothers spend more time on childcare and housework and are more likely to take time out of the 
workforce and to reduce their labor supply to care for children compared to their male counterparts 
(OECD, 2012). These career interruptions have long-term implications for other career outcomes 
for mothers, such as earnings, and these penalties persist across countries and welfare regimes to 
varying degrees of severity (e.g.  Budig, Misra, & Boeckmann, 2012; Harkness & Waldfogel, 
2003; Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel, 2007). 
Daddy quotas – non-transferrable periods of leave reserved for fathers – may alleviate motherhood 
penalties by encouraging more gender-equal divisions of labor within the household, by allowing 
mothers to dedicate more time to paid work and by eroding possible employer biases. However, 
research on the effect of daddy quotas on mothers’ labor market outcomes thus far is inconclusive.  
The causal studies published to date focus predominantly on Scandinavian countries and produce 
conflicting results; some have found that daddy quota policies improve mothers’ labor market 
outcomes (Andersen, 2018 for Denmark; Johansson, 2010 for Sweden; Patnaik, 2019 for Quebec) 
while others have found no effect (Ekberg, Eriksson, & Friebel, 2013 for Sweden) and still others 
have estimated negative effects (Cools, Fiva, & Kirkeboen, 2015 for Norway).   
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Despite the lack of consistent evidence on the labor market effects of these policies, non-
transferrable paternity leave continues to appear on the policy agendas of governments and 
political parties from South Korea to Spain to the United Kingdom (Koslowski et al., 2019). As 
countries continue to adopt or consider adopting daddy quotas as means of addressing gender 
inequalities at work and at home, further evidence is needed to understand their effects across 
welfare state contexts.  
This paper contributes to this effort by analyzing the impact of the implementation of a 2006 daddy 
quota policy on mothers’ labor market outcomes in Quebec, Canada. Using a difference-in-
difference technique (DiD), we examine the impact of the policy on women’s labor force 
participation, full-time and part-time employment, unemployment, and hourly wages in the five 
years after implementation. We find that exposure to the policy substantially increases mothers’ 
likelihood of participating in the labor force and working full-time, and decreases their likelihood 
of working part-time and being unemployed. We find no statistically significant effect on hourly 
wages. Furthermore, we find that the effects of the policy are largest in 2008 and 2009, two to 
three years post reform, raising questions over whether the policy had lasting effects. Our findings 
are robust to an alternative semi-parametric DiD methodology and a battery of placebo and 
sensitivity tests. 
We make several contributions to the ongoing debate over the effects of daddy quota policies on 
mothers’ employment outcomes. First, our study explores the impact of daddy quota policies on 
mothers’ labor market outcomes in a context outside of the generous social welfare benefits, high 
levels of decommodification and egalitarianism that characterize Nordic welfare states. Research 
on the effect of daddy quotas in a variety of welfare state regimes is critical in gaining a more 
comprehensive understanding of the policy instrument. The context of Quebec provides a 
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particularly interesting case, as it is considered a hybrid between Canada’s liberal welfare state 
model and the more pro-natalist, conservative welfare regime characteristic of France, with which 
the province shares linguistic and cultural roots (Bernard and Saint-Arnaud, 2004; Béland and 
Lecours, 2006). At the same time, Quebec’s provision of separate parental leave entitlements 
together with childcare services for the young children also reflects elements of the Nordic welfare 
state model where a mix of supported familialism and decommodified defamilialisation co-exist 
(Saraceno and Keck, 2010, 2011). These unique characteristics of Quebec’s policy landscape make 
it a particularly compelling setting for studying the effect of daddy quota policies on mothers’ 
labor market outcomes. 
Second, we improve upon the only existing causal study on Quebec’s daddy quota by employing 
a design that exploits eight years of labor force survey data, allowing us to establish with greater 
confidence that the identifying assumptions of our analysis hold true. Third, we explore the impact 
of Quebec’s daddy quota on a broad range of labor market outcomes, including those that capture 
outcomes on the intensive margin (full-time employment, part-time employment and hourly 
wages) and the extensive margin (labor force participation and unemployment). Finally, we 
explore the development and durability of Quebec’s daddy quota policy, analysing the policy’s 
effects on a year-by-year basis over five years post reform. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
2.1. The Introduction of QPIP 
Implemented on January 1, 2006, the Regime Quebecois D’assurance Parentale or the Quebec 
Parental Insurance Plan (QPIP) made substantial changes to the parental leave scheme in Quebec. 
The policy replaced the national parental leave scheme provided by the Employment Insurance 
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(EI) program, which entitled parents to one-year job-protected leave after the birth of a child. 
QPIP’s provisions, detailed in  
Studies reveal that the implementation of QPIP had a number of effects on parents leave taking 
behavior, increasing mothers’ and particularly fathers’ use of leave (Patnaik 2019; discussed in 
detail below) and decreasing class inequalities in access to leave benefits (McKay, Mathieu and 
Doucet, 2016).  
, were designed to improve upon the national EI program by reducing barriers to parents’ use of 
parental leave provisions by increasing flexibility, eligibility and economic feasibility of taking 
leave as well as addressing gendered attitudes toward parental leave (Patnaik, 2019).  
Table 2.1. Comparison of QPIP and EI Benefit Details 
(Service Canada, 2016) Note: maximum insurable earnings caps reflect 2006 figures. 
QPIP also introduced a daddy quota, where five weeks of leave (or three weeks with higher wage 
replacement) are reserved exclusively for fathers and cannot be transferred to mothers. While 
 EI QPIP 
Choice of duration None Basic plan (BP) or special plan (SP) 
Maternity 
leave 
Duration 15 weeks 18 (BP) or 15 weeks (SP) 
Benefit 55% 70% (BP) or 75% (SP) 
Paternity 
leave 
Duration None 5 (BP) or 3 weeks (SP) 
Benefit None 70% (BP) or 75% (SP) 
Parental 
leave 
Duration 35 weeks  32 (BP) or 25 weeks (SP) 
Benefit 55% 7 weeks at 70% and 25 weeks at 55% 
(BP) or 25 weeks at 75% (SP) 
Coverage Employed workers Employed and self-employed workers 
Eligibility requirements 600 hr. insurable 
earnings 
Insurable income of $2000 
Maximum annual 
insurable earnings 
$39,000 $57,000 
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fathers had access to parental leave through the shared leave offered under EI, they had no 
individual right to paternity leave. QPIP had a substantial impact on fathers’ use of paternity leave 
in Quebec: Patnaik (2019) estimated that exposure to the policy increased take up by 53 percentage 
points and increased leave duration by 3 weeks on average. 
Studies reveal that the implementation of QPIP had a number of effects on parents leave taking 
behavior, increasing mothers’ and particularly fathers’ use of leave (Patnaik 2019; discussed in 
detail below) and decreasing class inequalities in access to leave benefits (McKay, Mathieu and 
Doucet, 2016).  
2.2. Drivers of Motherhood Penalties in the Labor Market 
Empirical work has consistently found that mothers’ wages, labor force attachment and 
occupational mobility suffer compared to those of non-mothers and men across OECD countries 
and over time (OECD, 2012; Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel, 2007). A number of prominent theories 
have sought to explain the persistence of motherhood penalties in the labor market. One theory, 
advanced by Becker (1985), contends that mothers’ lowered labor market outcomes are the result 
of efficient gender-role specialization at the household level. Because women spend time and 
effort on care work – and because both are finite resources – women economize on their 
participation in paid work, reducing their productivity and/or work hours or selecting into less 
demanding occupations with greater flexibility and often poorer remuneration. Other established 
theories regarding the drivers of motherhood penalties highlight the human capital depreciation 
mothers experience after taking time off work around the birth of a child (e.g. Mincer and 
Polachek, 1974), employer discrimination against mothers (e.g. Correl, Benard and Paik, 2007), 
and unobserved heterogeneity between mothers and non-mothers.  
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Institutions also play an important role shaping and perpetuating motherhood penalties in the labor 
market by structuring the constraints and opportunities parents face in decisions regarding their 
labor supply and the gender division of labor within the household (e.g. Folbre, 1994; Sainsbury, 
1996; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Gornick and Meyers, 2009). As emphasized in Saraceno and Keck 
(2010, 2011), policies such as parental leave, cash-for-care benefits, childcare provision or 
subsidy, and tax and pension policies can shape gender equality outcomes at work and within the 
household by incentivizing and legitimating certain divisions of labor and in turn structuring 
individual preferences. In this way, institutions and policies can both exacerbate and alleviate 
motherhood penalties, depending on the incentives they create. 
2.3. Addressing Motherhood Penalties by Reducing Sex Specialization 
Paternity leave and daddy quota policies have typically been implemented with a range of aims, 
including increasing fertility, promoting gender equality and improving child outcomes (e.g. Ray, 
Gornick and Schmitt, 2010; for Canada see McKay and Doucet, 2010; McKay, Mathieu and 
Doucet, 2016). The evidence suggests these policies may be particularly effective in reducing sex 
specialization within the household through a variety of mechanisms. Fathers who take paternity 
leave increase their skills as caregivers, becoming better equipped and therefore more likely to 
provide care later on in children’s lives (Lammi-Taskula, 2006; Hook, 2010). Fathers’ take up of 
paternity leave may also establish more gender egalitarian divisions of household labor within 
couples that endure beyond the period of leave taken (Bjornberg, 2002; Hook, 2006, 2010). Indeed, 
several studies have found that fathers who participate in paternity leave are more likely to be 
involved in childcare responsibilities in subsequent years compared with fathers who do not take 
leave (Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel, 2007; Tanaka and Waldfogel, 2007; Haas and Hwang, 
2008). Evidence from one qualitative study showed that in Quebec, the implementation of a daddy 
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quota changed within-couple negotiation dynamics about return to work compared to couples in 
Ontario (McKay and Doucet, 2010). 
The reduction of sex specialization within the household may help erode motherhood penalties in 
the labor market by allowing mothers to dedicate more time and energy to paid work, reducing 
potential human capital depreciation around the birth of a child as well as any real or perceived 
productivity losses employers associate with motherhood (e.g. Correl, Benard, & Paik, 2007). 
However, fathers face disincentives to taking parental leave in countries with gender-neutral leave 
policies (e.g. Fox, Pascall, & Warren, 2009; Haas & Rostgaard, 2011; OECD, 2012). Because 
leave benefits are often calculated as percentages of the leave taker’s wages and are capped at a 
modest level, it often makes more sense economically for the lower-earning parent (often the 
mother) to take leave (Zhelyazkova, 2013). Employers’ gendered attitudes can also disincentivize 
men from taking parental leave available to them (Bygren and Duvander, 2006). Daddy quotas 
address such obstacles by providing economic incentives to take leave and by normalizing 
paternity leave (Haas and Rostgaard, 2011).  
2.4. Previous Research on the Impact of Daddy Quotas 
While previous research has identified an association between daddy quotas and more gender 
egalitarian divisions of labor (e.g. Brandth & Kvande, 1998; Hook, 2010; Sullivan et al., 2009), 
causal studies analyzing the effects of such policies have found mixed results and have focused 
predominantly on Scandinavian countries. Analyzing the 1993 implementation of a 4-week daddy 
quota in Norway, Kotsadam and Finseraas (2011) found that parents exposed to the policy were 
50% more likely to share the task of washing clothes equally between partners 15 years post 
reform, suggesting the policy was successful in encouraging de-specialization. However, Cools et 
al. (2015), studying the same reform, found no evidence that the policy benefited mothers’ labor 
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market outcomes two to five years post reform. In fact, their analysis of the policy’s effects on 
mothers found it decreased their annual earnings by 3.5%, with negligible effects on employment, 
full-time and part-time employment.  
Analysing the 1995 introduction of a one-month daddy quota in Sweden, Ekberg et al. (2013) 
found no evidence that the policy decreased specialization within the household, finding no 
significant effect on fathers’ likelihood of caring for a sick child eight years post reform and no 
effects on mothers’ labor market outcomes 13 years post reform. In contrast, Johansson (2010), 
examining the same reform and the 2012 extension of the Swedish daddy quota, found an increase 
in mothers’ annual earnings of 6.7% for each month of leave taken by fathers, although this 
estimation was only significant at the 10% level.  
Studying the Danish context, Andersen (2018) used register data to analyze the impact of five 
parental leave systems on within couple gender wage gaps. She found that increases in fathers’ 
household share of leave reduces gender wage gaps by increasing mothers’ wages. 
A few causal studies have focused on the labor market impacts of various types of paternity leave 
policies apart from daddy quotas, such as the Elterngeld policy in Germany, which, among other 
reforms, introduced a bonus period of leave granted to parents where both parents share a portion 
of the leave. These papers found that the policy led to an increase in fathers’ take up of parental 
leave (Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2012), that fathers who took paternity leave subsequently increased 
their time spent on childcare and decreased their time spent on market work (Bünning, 2015), and 
that the policy increased mothers’ employment rates (although gains were largely concentrated in 
part-time work), job continuity and job quality (Kluve and Schmitz, 2014). A recent paper 
analyzing the effects of a 2007 introduction of a two-week paternity leave policy in Spain on 
fertility via the policy’s impacts on the costs associated with childbearing found the policy 
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increased mothers’ labor force attachment and led to delays in subsequent childbearing (Farré and 
González, 2019). 
Patnaik (2019) used cross-sectional time-use data from the General Social Survey to investigate 
the impact of the Quebecois daddy quota (QPIP) on sex-specialization, finding that the policy 
increased fathers’ time spent in unpaid domestic work by over half an hour per day and increased 
mothers’ time spent in paid work by an hour per day four years post reform. She also found 
indicative evidence that the policy increased employment and full-time employment by 5%. 
Patnaik’s estimated effects on employment and full-time employment are similar in magnitude to 
our estimates, although these were only significant at the 10% level. This lack of precision may be 
due to her limited sample size: the total number of observations in the treatment group in her 
analysis is around 200 individuals across pre- and post-periods.  
Although Patnaik’s results are promising evidence of the effects of QPIP on de-specialization, a 
key drawback of her study design is that she only uses one pre-reform and one post-reform 
observation due to data availability, which is problematic for several reasons. First, this design 
does not allow for sufficient reassurance that the parallel trends assumption underpinning her 
difference-in-difference design is met. Second, it does not allow for placebo tests around the 
treatment year to ensure estimates identify effects of the policy rather than larger macro trends. 
Finally, Patnaik’s reliance on time-use data – although useful for understanding relative time-use 
among members of a household – may provide less reliable measurements of employment 
activities and patterns throughout the year. Because time diaries record how individuals spend their 
time on a given day or set of days, they unable to capture variations in working patterns throughout 
the year, such as seasonal employment, which may bias the results of Patnaik’s analysis. 
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This paper improves upon the previous research on the implementation of Quebec’s daddy quota, 
employing a difference-in-difference design that uses three years of pre-reform and five years of 
post-reform data, and using a labor force survey designed to capture employment patterns. In doing 
so, we contribute to the growing causal literature on daddy quotas, increasing the evidence base 
with which to assess the efficacy of such policies in diminishing the motherhood penalties women 
face in the labor market. We explore a broad range of labor market outcomes, including those that 
capture effects on the extensive margin such as labor force participation and unemployment, as 
well as those on the intensive margin, like full-time and part-time employment and hourly wages. 
Finally, unlike previous studies, we also explore how the effects of the policy develop across five 
years post reform to better understand when effects emerge, how they change over time and 
whether they endure.  
3. DATA AND METHODS 
We use a difference-in-difference (DiD) technique to estimate QPIP’s impact on mothers in 
Quebec with respect to five labor market outcomes, comparing differences in outcomes for Quebec 
mothers before the reform (2003-2005) and after the reform (2007-2011) with the same difference 
in outcomes for mothers in the neighboring province of Ontario.  
3.1. Data 
We conduct our analysis using annual cross-sectional public use microdata from Statistics 
Canada’s Survey of Labour Income Dynamics (SLID) (goo.gl/FttctT) for reference years 2003 – 
2011, omitting data from the treatment year (2006) as we are unlikely to observe effects of QPIP 
in such an early phase of implementation. SLID is an annual household survey of approximately 
34,000 households (over eight waves) representing the populations of Canada’s 10 provinces. The 
data contains detailed information on respondents’ labor market activities, as well as information 
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on family characteristics. While SLID has a rotating panel design, due to concerns over sample 
size we use it cross sectionally. 
3.2. Identification strategy 
Using information on the age of the youngest person in the respondents’ census family (defined as 
a nuclear family), we identify Quebec mothers of young children as our treatment group. This 
group includes Quebec mothers with children under the age of 6 in the pre-period, and those whose 
youngest child was born after QPIP’s implementation (January 1, 2006) in the post period. For 
example, in reference year 2007 our treatment group is defined as Quebec mothers whose youngest 
child is 1 year old or younger, while in 2008 our treatment group includes Quebec mothers whose 
youngest child is 2 years old or younger.  
We restrict our treatment group to married and cohabitating mothers of small children in Quebec. 
These women, we argue, are most likely to experience potential benefits to their careers by 
increased involvement of fathers in child rearing activities, although we are unable to determine 
from the data whether their partners actually took up the leave available to them. We exclude 
mothers under the age of 18, as these mothers are likely to be in full-time secondary education. 
We also exclude women where the age difference between women and the youngest child in the 
census family is greater than 50; as SLID does not specify the precise relationship between the 
youngest person in the census family and the respondent, we expect such cases to be guardianship 
or grandparent relationships.  
Our primary comparison group consists of mothers of young children from the neighboring 
province of Ontario. Quebec and Ontario are the two most populous provinces in Canada and 
constitute the country’s two largest regional economies. The provinces are comparable on a 
number of indicators of interest prior to 2006, such as women’s labor force participation rate, 
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unemployment rate and the prevalence of dual earner couples (Statistics Canada, 2017, 2019). 
Prior to QPIP’s 2006 implementation, they also offered parents the same parental leave scheme 
(the Employment Insurance program), which continued in Ontario after 2006. Analysis of 
province-level characteristics and labor market trends prior to QPIP’s implementation suggest that 
mothers of young children from Ontario to be a suitable comparison group for Quebecois mothers 
(see section 3.3 for a discussion of parallel trends). Table 3.1 shows the sample sizes and definition 
of our treatment and control groups over our period of analysis. Our treatment group is comprised 
of 2,761 mothers and our control group of 3,687 mothers. 
Table 3.1 Treatment and control group sample sizes and definitions by year 
Year Sample definition 
Treatment  
(Quebec) N 
Control 
(Ontario) N 
2003 Mothers whose youngest child is 0-5 407 644 
2004 Mothers whose youngest child is 0-5 385 581 
2005 Mothers whose youngest child is 0-5 409 604 
2007 Mothers whose youngest child is 0-1 182 214 
2008 Mothers whose youngest child is 0-2 279 327 
2009 Mothers whose youngest child is 0-3 339 399 
2010 Mothers whose youngest child is 0-4 365 432 
2011 Mothers whose youngest child is 0-5 395 486 
  Total  2,761 3,687 
 
In an alternative methodology, we construct a comparison group of mothers with young children 
from across Canada with similar characteristics using propensity score matching (see section 5 for 
further discussion). 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate a standard DiD specification: 
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Outcome! =	β" +	β#TREAT! +	β$POST% +	β&(TREAT × POST)' +	δ! + λ' +	ε! 
The subscript 𝑖 denotes the individual in year 𝑡. TREAT! is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the 
respondent is a member of the treatment group, as defined in the previous section; 𝑷𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒕 is a 
dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the observation is in the post-period; 𝜹𝒊 is a vector of controls; and 
𝝀𝒕 denotes year fixed effects. 𝜷𝟑 is our parameter of interest and is an Intention to Treat (ITT) 
estimate of the impact of QPIP on our labor market outcomes for the population of eligible 
partnered Quebec mothers.  
We use three specifications to estimate the effect of QPIP on each labor market outcome of interest. 
Model 1 follows the standard DiD specification above, combining years 2007-2011 in a single 
post period with no control variables. Model 2 controls for factors closely associated with labor 
market outcomes including age, age-squared, number of children, years of education and years of 
work experience, which have been shown to significantly influence mothers’ labor market 
outcomes (e.g. Waldfogel, 1998). It also includes full year dummies to account for general period 
effects. Finally, because we are interested in the timing of effects post-reform, Model 3 repeats 
Model 2, replacing the basic (TREAT × POST)' interaction with a series of interactions for each 
post-reform year, allowing us to identify how post-reform effects manifest over time: 
Outcome! =	β" +	β#TREAT! +	β$(TREAT! × 2007)
+ β&(TREAT! × 2008) + β+(TREAT! × 2009) + β,(TREAT! × 2010)
+ β-(TREAT! × 2011) + δ. + λ' +	ε! 
We define our five outcome variables of interest using several SLID survey indicators. Labor force 
participation is equal to ‘1’ if the respondent is in the labor force during the reference year. Full-
time employment status, conditional on being in the labor force, is equal to ‘1’ if the respondent is 
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employed full-time during the reference year, and ‘0’ if unemployed or employed part-time. Part-
time employment status is equal to ‘1’ if the respondent is employed less than full-time during the 
given reference year. Unemployment is equal to ‘1’ if the respondent is unemployed at any point 
during the reference year and ‘0’ if employed throughout the reference year. Log hourly wage is 
based on a continuous measure of hourly wages for all respondents with earnings in the reference 
year and is expressed in 2002 Canadian Dollars (rebased using Statistics Canada’s annual 
consumer price index).  Our analyses of binary outcome measures use linear probability models. 
Detailed descriptions of these measures are available in the online supplementary materials.  
3.3. Comparing Labor Market Outcomes in Treatment and Control Groups  
Error! Reference source not found. displays trends for Quebec and Ontario mothers along our 
five outcome variables of interest from 2003-2011 (see Supplementary Table 1 for full summary 
statistics). Prior to QPIP’s implementation in 2006, all outcome indicators develop roughly in 
parallel. From 2007-2011 however, we observe a steep increase in labor force participation rate 
and full-time employment for Quebec mothers, while these indicators remain relatively stable for 
Ontario mothers. We also observe a steep decline in part-time employment and unemployment 
among Quebec mothers.  
[Insert Figure 3.1] 
3.4. Threats to Identification 
We identify four main threats to our identification strategy. Because our DiD model uses cross-
sectional data, it relies on the assumption that there are no compositional changes in our treatment 
or control group over time.  However, it is possible that QPIP fundamentally changed the 
composition of our treatment group in the post-reform period, perhaps encouraging women to have 
more children, inducing different types of women to become mothers or influencing decisions 
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about accumulating years of education or work experience prior to having children in light of the 
change in benefits.  
To assess QPIP’s effect on the composition of our treatment group, we run DiD models to test 
whether exposure to QPIP altered the composition of Quebec mothers along observable 
characteristics available in SLID: number of children, years of education, years of work 
experience, and age. The results from these models are shown in Table 3.2, where “DiD” is the 
difference-in-difference estimator estimating the effect of the introduction of QPIP on mothers’ 
characteristics, “Quebec” estimates the differences in mothers’ characteristics between Quebec 
and Ontario and “Post 2006” estimates differences in mothers’ characteristics between the pre- 
and post-period (2003-2005 and 2007-2011, respectively).  
If QPIP did indeed alter the composition of our treatment group, we would expect to find 
statistically significant DiD estimates in Table 3.2, however this is not the case. Although there 
are statistically significant differences between mothers in Quebec and Ontario on age and years 
of education, these do not develop differently over time following the introduction of QPIP (see 
Supplementary Table 2 for summary statistics for these measures). This provides some assurance 
that QPIP did not fundamentally alter the composition of Quebec mothers along characteristics we 
are able to observe in SLID, although our data does not allow us to explore other possible 
compositional measures such as the spacing of children or women’s career trajectories.  
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Table 3.2 Threat to identification check 1: Testing for compositional change in treatment group 
  
Years of 
education 
Years of work 
experience 
Age 
Number of 
children 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD  -0.17 0.13  0.04 0.29   0.22 0.25  -0.04 0.04 
Quebec -0.50**    0.1 -0.37 0.22 -1.36** 0.19 -0.09** 0.03 
Post 2006   0.10 0.08 -0.36 0.19  -0.38* 0.17  -0.02 0.03 
Constant 14.78** 0.06 8.44** 0.14 33.11** 0.12  2.00** 0.02 
N  7,521   6,450   7,521   7,521   
Note: * p<0.05. ** p<0.01; Ns differ for years of work experience due to missing data on this 
indicator.  
Second, it may also be a concern that parents may have strategically timed the birth of a child in 
order to be eligible for QPIP. Details about QPIP’s features and implementation date were not 
officially announced until March 2005, making such behavior unlikely. Still, our analysis omits 
data from 2006, likely accounting for any mothers who may have strategically delayed their births 
until QPIP’s implementation.  
Third, because our period of analysis encompasses the Great Recession (comprised of four quarters 
of negative GDP growth in 2009 in Canada), it is possible that differential effects of the recession 
between Quebec and Ontario might bias our results. If Ontario were disproportionally affected by 
the recession, our estimated effects of QPIP may be upwardly biased in years following the 
recession, while if Quebec were more severely affected, we might expect our estimates to be 
downwards biased.  
To test for this possibility, we run several DiD models using province-level GDP (in log 2007 
Canadian dollars) and unemployment rates from Statistics Canada (2017; 2018) as outcome 
measures. We analyze each outcome using two models: one pooling effects in post-treatment years 
(Model A) and the other disaggregating effects by year (Model B). As in Table 3.2, “DiD” presents 
our difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of QPIP on GDP and unemployment. “DiD 
2007” to “DiD 2011” show the difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of QPIP on GDP 
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and unemployment in each post-period year. If the recession did disproportionately affect one 
province over the other, which could lead to bias in our analysis, we would expect to find 
statistically significant DiD estimators in Table 3.3, particularly for DiD estimates in 2009 and 
beyond. However, we do not find a statistically significant effect of the recession on Quebec’s 
GDP or unemployment rate relative to Ontario in any of our specifications. We provide further 
evidence that that recession has not biased our results in our section 5. 
Table 3.3 Threat to identification check 3: Testing for differential recession impact on province 
GDP (ln 2007 Canadian dollars) and unemployment rate 
  (ln) GDP Unemployment 
 Model A Model B Model A Model B 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD  0.02 0.02   -1.77 0.83   
Quebec -0.67** 0.02 -0.67** 0.02 1.83* 0.65 1.83* 0.73 
Post 2006 0.05** 0.02 0.05* 0.02 0.97 0.58 0.97 0.65 
DiD 2007   -0.00 0.03   -2.27 1.22 
DiD 2008   0.02 0.03   -2.37 1.22 
DiD 2009   0.01 0.03   -0.97 1.22 
DiD 2010   0.03 0.03   -1.57 1.22 
DiD 2011   0.05 0.03   -1.67 1.22 
Constant 13.25** 0.01 13.25** 0.01 6.77** 0.46 6.77** 0.51 
N 16   16   16   16   
Note: * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Analysis based on data from CANISM table 384-0038 and CANISM 
table 282-0002. 
Finally, other policy changes implemented during this time might influence mothers’ outcomes. 
In addition to establishing a daddy quota, QPIP also made changes to maternity leave provisions, 
lowering eligibility requirements and increasing wage replacement generosity. Indeed, some 
qualitative evidence suggests that these changes have helped mitigate class inequality in access to 
parental leave benefits in Quebec (McKay, Mathieu and Doucet, 2016). That said, the inclusion of 
an individual entitlement to paternity leave reserved for fathers, where none previously existed, is 
the most dramatic change provided by QPIP. Analysis of the impact of the reform on parents’ 
leave-taking behavior suggests that the effect of the policy on parents’ behavior was also most 
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dramatic among fathers. Patnaik (2019) found that QPIP increased fathers’ take up rates by 250% 
(from 21% to 74%) and their average duration of leave by 160% (from 2.0 to 3.2 weeks) while it 
only increased mothers’ take up rates by 16% (from 73% to 85%) and their leave duration by 4% 
(from 42.5 to 44.4 weeks). 
Still, because the changes in maternity leave and paternity leave were implemented 
simultaneously, we cannot entirely isolate the effect of each change. Research suggests that 
maternity leave increases mothers’ employment continuity (e.g. Budig et al., 2012), raising the 
concern that our estimate of QPIP’s effect on mothers’ labor force participation may be upwardly 
biased. However, maternity leave may also increase specialization within the household – 
particularly as it increases in duration – by locating childcare responsibility within the family, and 
specifically among mothers. Evidence suggests that longer maternity leaves encourage part-time 
rather than full-time employment, carry a wage penalty and may exacerbate biased employer 
perceptions of mothers’ job commitment and competency (Morgan and Zippel, 2003; Buligescu 
et al., 2009; Pettit and Hook, 2009; Budig, Misra and Boeckmann, 2012; Morgenroth and Heilman, 
2017). Thus, QPIP’s extension of maternity leave may lead to an underestimation of the effect a 
daddy quota on these outcomes through this analysis, if increased maternity leave operates in the 
reverse direction to the effects of a daddy quota. 
Researching further changes to Quebec and Canadian family policy beyond QPIP, we find no other 
substantial changes during the period of analysis. Quebec has a publicly subsidized childcare 
system, unlike the rest of Canada, which may make it easier for Quebecois women to participate 
in paid employment (Fortin, Godbout and St-Cerny, 2012; Moyser and Milan, 2018). However, 
this system was first implemented in 1997, nearly a decade prior to QPIP, and there were no 
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changes to Quebec’s childcare policy during our period of analysis, (2003-2011). Therefore, the 
existence of the previous policy is unlikely to bias our results.  
4. RESULTS 
Table 4.1 reports the linear probability model results from our DiD specifications estimating the 
impact of QPIP on Quebec mothers’ labor force participation.  
In Model 2, we estimate the policy increases Québécois mothers’ likelihood of being in the labor 
force by 5 percentage points compared to the Ontarian mothers in our control group over the five 
year period following the policy change. This 5-percentage point increase equates to a 6 percent 
increase from our expected labor force participation among Quebec mothers of 75%. In Model 3, 
however, we find that the effect of the reform varies over time. We observe no effect in 2007, 
perhaps indicating lagged effects of the policy. We find mothers exposed to the policy are 8 
percentage points more likely to participate in the labor force in 2008, relative to expectations in 
the absence of the policy, and 7 percentage points more likely in 2009. In 2010 and 2011, however, 
we find statistically non-significant – although still positive – effects. 
Table 4.1. Impact of QPIP on Mothers' Labor Force Participation, LPM Results N=6,450 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD  0.04 0.02 0.05* 0.02   
Quebec 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Post 2006 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02   
DiD 2007     0.00 0.05 
DiD 2008     0.08* 0.04 
DiD 2009     0.07* 0.03 
DiD 2010     0.06 0.03 
DiD 2011     0.02 0.03 
Controls No Yes Yes 
R2 0.00 0.16 0.16 
F 5.81*** 87.21** 68.01** 
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Note: Controls include full year dummies, age, age-squared and number of children years of 
education and years of work experience; * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 present the results from our specifications estimating the impact of QPIP 
on the likelihood that Quebec mothers report full-time and part-time employment. In Model 2, we 
find a significant effect across both outcomes: mothers exposed to the policy are 5 percentage 
points more likely to work full time and 5 percentage points less likely to work part time in the 
post-reform period relative to Ontario mothers. These results constitute an 8% increase in full-time 
employment over the expected full-time employment rate in the absence of QPIP, 64.7%, and a 
16% decrease from the expected part-time employment rate, 33.0%. Breaking these results down 
by year in Model 3 we find virtually no effect in 2007 on either outcome. We find a statistically 
significant increase in full-time employment of 14 percentage points relative to expected outcomes 
in the absence of the policy and a decrease in part-time employment of the same magnitude in 
2008 and 2009, but in 2010 and 2011 we find negligible and non-significant effects across 
outcomes.  
Table 4.2 Impact of QPIP on Mothers’ Full-Time Employment, LPM Results N=5,308 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD  0.04 0.03 0.05* 0.03   
Quebec 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Post 2006 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03   
DiD 2007     -0.01 0.05 
DiD 2008     0.14** 0.04 
DiD 2009     0.14** 0.04 
DiD 2010     0.02 0.04 
DiD 2011     -0.01 0.04 
Controls No Yes Yes 
R2             0.01                 0.13                  0.13 
F 9.38*** 57.34** 46.06** 
Note: Controls include full year dummies, age, age-squared and number of children years of 
education and years of work experience; * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 4.3. Impact of QPIP on Mothers' Part-Time Employment, LPM Results N=5,130 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD  -0.04 0.03 -0.05* 0.03   
Quebec -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
Post 2006 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.03   
DiD 2007     0.01 0.05 
DiD 2008     -0.14** 0.05 
DiD 2009     -0.14** 0.04 
DiD 2010     -0.02 0.04 
DiD 2011     0.01 0.04 
Controls No Yes Yes 
R2               0.00                 0.11                 0.11 
F 8.73*** 44.52** 36.01** 
Note: Controls include full year dummies, age, age-squared and number of children years of 
education and years of work experience; * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the increase in mothers’ labor force participation largely 
manifests as full-time employment rather than as part-time employment. This distinction is 
important as part-time employment often translates to lower pay and fewer opportunities for career 
advancement (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008). 
Shown in Table 4.4, we find that QPIP decreased the likelihood that Quebec mothers are 
unemployed by 4 percentage points relative to our expectations in the absence of the policy 
according to our Model 2 specification. This is a substantial effect, constituting around 10% 
decrease from the expected unemployment rate among mothers on average per year in the absence 
of the policy, 9.3%. In Model 3, we find no effect on unemployment in 2007 and a reduction in 
the likelihood of being unemployed by 7 percentage points in 2008 and by 6 percentage points in 
2009. In 2010 and 2011 we continue to find negative effects, although these are not statistically 
significant.  
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Table 4.4. Impact of QPIP on Mothers' Unemployment, LPM Results N=4,655 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD  -0.04* 0.02 -0.04** 0.02   
Quebec 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Post 2006 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02   
DiD 2007     0.00 0.03 
DiD 2008     -0.07* 0.03 
DiD 2009     -0.06* 0.02 
DiD 2010     -0.05 0.03 
DiD 2011     -0.04 0.02 
Controls No Yes Yes 
R2 0.00 0.03 0.03 
F 4.39** 6.55** 5.24** 
Note: Controls include full year dummies, age, age-squared and number of children years of 
education and years of work experience; * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
Finally, we explore QPIP’s impact on mothers’ hourly wages. Our ex ante expectation is that by 
encouraging a more gender equal division of household labor, QPIP would allow mothers to devote 
more time and effort to paid labor, which, over time should increase their financial compensation. 
However, as shown in Table 4.5, our results do not support this hypothesis. We find positive but 
statistically non-significant effects on hourly wages across our models. 
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Table 4.5. Impact of QPIP on Mothers' Hourly Wages, OLS Results N=4,665 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD  0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02   
Quebec -0.13** 0.02 -0.06** 0.02 -0.06** 0.02 
Post 2006 0.10** 0.02 0.08* 0.03   
DiD 2007     0.03 0.05 
DiD 2008     0.02 0.04 
DiD 2009     0.03 0.04 
DiD 2010     0.06 0.04 
DiD 2011     0.06 0.03 
Controls No Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.34 0.34 
F 41.74*** 170.01*** 132.79*** 
Note: Controls include full year dummies, age, age-squared and number of children years of 
education and years of work experience; * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
We run a series of robustness checks using our Model 2 specification. First, we run a semi-
parametric DiD model for each outcome variable. Rather than using Ontario mothers as a control 
group, we use kernel propensity score matching to construct a group of mothers with children age 
5 and under from across Canada who are comparable to Quebec mothers in age, years of education 
and number of children.  
The results from these specifications, shown in Table 5.1, strongly support our main results. We 
find that exposure to QPIP increases likelihood of labor force participation by 6 percentage points 
in the post period relative to expected outcomes based on time tends of comparable mothers in our 
constructed control group. We find the policy also increases Quebec mothers’ likelihood of 
working full time by 4 percentage points and decreases the likelihood of working part time by 4 
percentage points and unemployment by 2 percentage points. Again, we find no statistically 
significant effect on wages.  
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Table 5.1 Robustness Check 1: Semi-Parametric Difference-in-Difference Models 
  
Labor force 
participation 
Full-time 
employment 
Part-time 
employment 
Unemploy-
ment 
(ln) Hourly 
wages 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD 0.06** 0.02 0.04* 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
R2 0.16  0.12  0.10  0.03  0.32  
N 13,260   10,635  10,307   9,197   9,240   
Note: Models include full year dummies and controls for age, age-squared and number of 
children years of education and years of work experience; * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
Next, we run Model 2 using 2004 as a placebo treatment year, with our pre-period defined as 2002-
2003 and our post-period is defined as 2005-2011. If our main results are attributable to QPIP’s 
implementation in 2006, we should not find significant effects under this placebo specification. 
Indeed, as shown in Table 5.2, none of our placebo DiD estimators is statistically significant.  
Table 5.2 Robustness Check 2: Placebo Treatment Year (2004) 
  
Labor force 
participation 
Full-time 
employment 
Part-time 
employment 
Unemploy-
ment 
(ln) Hourly 
wages 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 
R2 0.17  0.12  0.10  0.02  0.33  
N 7,459   6,072   5,877   5,345   5,365   
Note: Models include full year dummies and controls for age, age-squared and number of 
children years of education and years of work experience; * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
Third, we estimate the QPIP’s effect on two alternative treatment groups: mothers of older children 
in Quebec and fathers of young children in Quebec. If our main results are attributable QPIP, we 
should find no effect on mothers with older children, who were ineligible for the policy. Among 
fathers, we should no improvements in labor market outcomes if the policy operates according to 
our expectations – although we may find a decline in fathers’ labor market outcomes if QPIP is 
successful in reducing gendered specialization within the household. Mothers of older children are 
defined as those whose youngest child is between 6-17 years of age. We define fathers of young 
children in the same way we defined mothers of young children in our main models: those whose 
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youngest child is under the age of 6 in the pre-period, and those whose youngest child was born 
after the implementation of QPIP on January 1, 2006 in the post-period. 
We run our Model 2 specifications on both of these alternative treatment groups. As shown in 
Table 5.3, among mothers of older children we do find a statistically significant effect older 
mothers’ labor force participation of comparable magnitude to that found among mothers of young 
children, although we find no statistically significant impact on older mothers’ full-time or part-
time employment, unemployment or hourly wages or any labor market outcomes for fathers of 
young children. The significant effect on labor force participation among older mothers raises 
some concern that the effect identified in our main specification may be picking up on a general 
trend for all mothers, rather than the effect of QPIP itself. If this were the case however, we might 
also expect to find comparable results to our main specifications on older mothers’ full-time 
employment, part-time employment and unemployment. That we find no significant effects on 
these outcomes for older mothers provides some re-assurance as to the validity of our results. 
Table 5.3 Robustness Check 3: Alternative treatment groups 
  
Labor force 
participation 
Full-time 
employment 
Part-time 
employment 
Unemploy-
ment 
(ln) Hourly 
wages 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Mothers of older children  
DiD 0.06** 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
R2 0.13  0.14  0.12  0.02  0.29 R2 
N 11,131   9,680   9,420   8,927   8,344 N 
Fathers of young children 
DiD -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
R2 0.17  0.15  0.14  0.03  0.35  
N 6,352   5,680   5,542   5,185   4,971   
Note: Models include full year dummies and controls for age, age-squared and number of children, 
years of education and years of work experience; * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
In addition to these checks, we run a robustness check testing for recession effects, a series of 
additional models controlling for fathers’ education and employment characteristics, and several 
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additional specifications to test the sensitivity of our results to alternative sample definitions and 
to the age of children. The results of these checks (presented in Supplementary Tables 3-8) are 
largely consistent with our main findings and are discussed in detail in the Supplemental Material 
available online.  
6. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
The results of our analysis suggest that the introduction of QPIP improved some of mothers’ labor 
market outcomes in the province, with Quebec mothers exposed to the policy more likely to 
participate in the labor force than they would have been in the absence of the policy. Further 
investigation shows that much of this increased labor force participation manifests as full-time 
work and that mothers exposed to the policy are less likely work part-time and less likely to be 
unemployed. Finally, although these findings are in line with our hypothesis that a daddy quota 
such as QPIP may reduce mothers’ specialization at the household level, allowing them to dedicate 
more time and effort to paid work, we do not find evidence that the policy had a statistically 
significant effect on mothers’ hourly wages. These results are robust to a battery of placebo and 
sensitivity tests, including an alternative non-parametric matching technique, a year placebo test, 
and a variety of robustness checks using placebo treatment groups.  
The null result on mothers’ hourly wages could be interpreted in a number of ways. First, it is 
possible that QPIP simply had no discernable impact on mothers’ wages. It is also possible that it 
may take several years to observe substantial increases in earnings associated with increased 
participation in the labor force, and that our period of analysis is too short to capture such effects. 
Alternatively, the result could indicate that although QPIP increases mothers’ labor market 
activities, it does not diminish the competency bias they face in the work place (e.g. Correll, 
Benard, & Paik, 2007) and therefore does not result in higher wages. The repeated cross-sectional 
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nature of our data substantially limits our ability to explore these possibilities further. Future 
research would benefit from longitudinal analysis of wage trajectories, which could better reflect 
how mothers’ wages develop longitudinally as a result of QPIP. 
Our results broken down by year find that QPIP’s effects are concentrated in 2008 and 2009, 
decreasing in size and significance in 2010 and 2011. That the dissipation of QPIP’s effects took 
place in the immediate wake of the Canada’s Great Recession in 2009 raises questions over the 
efficacy of such policies in times of economic uncertainty. Alternatively, the decrease in size and 
statistical significance of QPIP’s effects on mothers’ labor market outcomes could indicate that 
the effects of the policy are exclusively short-term and have no lasting impact on mothers’ career 
outcomes in the medium run. In an effort to explore this possibility, we conducted an exploratory 
triple difference model analysing QPIP’s effects on Quebec mothers, broken down by age of child. 
However small cell counts and a lack of precision made it difficult to draw a clear conclusion about 
how the policies effects differ across the age of the child.  
As suggested above, future research could shed light on this question by analysing mothers’ 
outcomes longitudinally and over a longer period of time, which was not possible in this analysis 
due to sample size constraints of SLID’s panel component and the survey’s discontinuation in 
2011. Such analysis would provide valuable insight into when and how QPIP’s impact on mothers’ 
labor market outcomes manifest and how they develop in the longer term as children grow older.  
This research contributes to the broader literature on work-family reconciliation policies by 
assessing the effects of the implementation of a daddy quota in a non-Nordic setting and adds to a 
growing body of empirical evaluations of such policy instruments. Given the increasing 
prominence of daddy quotas in policy debates across industrialized countries, gaining a better 
understanding of the effect of daddy quotas as a potential policy tool for addressing economic 
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gender inequalities in a variety of contexts is critical. Our results should be considered alongside 
the findings of previous research. Our estimates show that QPIP increases mothers’ labor force 
participation and full-time employment and decreases their part-time employment and 
unemployment, in line with Patnaik’s (2019) findings that the policy increased mothers’ time spent 
in paid work. However, these findings are at odds with the null and negative effects on mothers’ 
labor supply in Norway identified by Ekberg et al. (2013) and by Cools et al. (2015), respectively. 
On the other hand, our non-significant results regarding QPIP’s effect on mothers’ wages appears 
to contrast both Johansson's (2010) and Andersen’s (2018) positive estimates and Cools et al.’s 
(2015) negative one.  
The results from this analysis provide important evidence that daddy quotas may be useful policy 
tools for addressing gender inequalities in the labor market; however, further research in this area 
is warranted. First, future work is needed to understand the discrepancies in effects identified 
across country contexts. In particular, an examination of whether the explicit motivation for daddy 
quota policies (including promoting gender equality and involved fatherhood, improving child 
outcomes and increasing fertility) and existing work-family support structures (such as childcare) 
mediate the effects of the policy on mothers’ labor market outcomes is needed. Second, as more 
than a decade has now passed since the implementation of the policy, future studies would do well 
to investigate longer-term effects of the reform. Future investigations would also benefit from 
considering additional labor market outcomes unavailable in SLID like job promotions or female 
entrepreneurship. Finally, further research on QPIP and daddy quotas in other contexts is required 
to gain an understanding of how such policies operate under varying macroeconomic conditions, 
particularly during and outside recessions and other such global shocks.  
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR ONLINE APPENDIX 
Labor Market Outcome Variables of Interest 
We define our outcome variables of interest using several SLID survey indicators: 
1. Labor force participation, equal to ‘1’ if the respondent is in the labor force during the reference 
year and ‘0’ otherwise. 
2. Full-time employment status, conditional on being in the labor force, equal to ‘1’ if the 
respondent is employed full-time during the given reference year, and ‘0’ if unemployed or 
employed part-time. Respondents who are out of the labor force during the reference year are 
coded as missing.  
3. Part-time employment status, equal to ‘1’ if the respondent is employed less than full-time 
during the given reference year. This includes individuals who were employed part of the year 
as well as those employed part-time all year round. This indicator is equal to ‘0’ where the 
individual is employed full-time during the reference year. Respondents who are out of the 
labor force during the reference year are coded as missing. 
4. Unemployment, equal to ‘1’ if the respondent is unemployed at any point during the reference 
year and ‘0’ if the respondent is employed the entirety of the reference year. Respondents who 
are out of the labor force during the reference year are coded as missing. 
5. Log hourly wage, based on a continuous variable reporting hourly wages for all respondents 
with earnings during the reference year, expressed in constant 2002 Canadian Dollars (rebased 
using Statistics Canada’s annual consumer price index). This indicator uses SLID’s measure 
of pre-tax, pre-transfer earnings, recorded directly for respondents who report their earnings as 
an hourly amount, or converted to an hourly rate for individuals who report other wage formats 
using other information provided. 
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Supplementary Table 1 Labor Market Outcomes over time for Treatment and Control Groups 
    
Quebec 
Mothers 
Ontario 
Mothers Difference 
    M SD M SD  
2003 
Labor Force Participation (%) 74.02 0.44 70.85 0.45 3.17 
Full-Time Employment (%) 59.20 0.49 56.35 0.50 2.85 
Part-Time Employment (%) 39.05 0.49 41.75 0.49 -2.70 
Mean Hourly Wages ($) 16.86 8.08 18.98 9.86 -2.12** 
Unemployment (%) 10.26 0.30 7.66 0.27 2.61 
N 407  644   
2004 
Labor Force Participation (%) 70.13 0.46 70.40 0.46 -0.27 
Full-Time Employment (%) 58.59 0.49 55.99 0.50 2.60 
Part-Time Employment (%) 38.78 0.49 41.34 0.49 -2.56 
Mean Hourly Wages ($) 16.94 8.16 20.05 10.92 -3.12** 
Unemployment (%) 10.37 0.31 11.00 0.31 -0.63 
N 385   581   
2005 
Labor Force Participation (%) 71.15 0.45 70.20 0.46 0.95 
Full-Time Employment (%) 64.85 0.48 63.17 0.48 1.68 
Part-Time Employment (%) 33.95 0.47 34.59 0.48 -0.64 
Mean Hourly Wages ($) 16.65 7.86 19.68 9.91 -3.03** 
Unemployment (%) 8.59 0.28 6.84 0.25 1.75 
N 409   604     
2007 
Labor Force Participation (%) 70.33 0.46 70.09 0.46 0.24 
Full-Time Employment (%) 63.06 0.48 63.69 0.48 -0.63 
Part-Time Employment (%) 34.87 0.48 34.10 0.48 0.76 
Mean Hourly Wages ($) 18.52 10.38 20.92 10.53 -2.4* 
Unemployment (%) 7.81 0.27 5.33 0.23 2.48 
N 182   214     
2008 
Labor Force Participation (%) 74.91 0.43 67.58 0.47 7.33* 
Full-Time Employment (%) 71.17 0.45 55.86 0.50 15.31** 
Part-Time Employment (%) 27.19 0.45 41.87 0.49 -14.68** 
Mean Hourly Wages ($) 18.22 8.51 21.17 11.57 -2.94** 
Unemployment (%) 5.74 0.23 10.41 0.31 -4.67 
N 279   327     
2009 
Labor Force Participation (%) 75.81 0.43 68.67 0.46 7.14* 
Full-Time Employment (%) 70.63 0.46 57.10 0.50 13.53** 
Part-Time Employment (%) 27.60 0.45 41.04 0.49 -13.44** 
Mean Hourly Wages ($) 18.31 8.20 21.73 11.45 -3.42** 
Unemployment (%) 4.28 0.20 7.66 0.27 -3.38 
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N 339   399     
2010 
Labor Force Participation (%) 79.18 0.41 72.45 0.45 6.72* 
Full-Time Employment (%) 64.72 0.48 61.82 0.49 2.90 
Part-Time Employment (%) 33.65 0.47 35.61 0.48 -1.96 
Mean Hourly Wages ($) 19.43 9.83 21.99 11.71 -2.57** 
Unemployment (%) 7.96 0.27 10.54 0.31 -2.58 
N 365   432     
2011 
Labor Force Participation (%) 76.96 0.42 73.46 0.44 3.51 
Full-Time Employment (%) 67.73 0.47 66.33 0.47 1.40 
Part-Time Employment (%) 29.82 0.46 30.87 0.46 -1.05 
Mean Hourly Wages ($) 19.33 8.59 21.35 9.47 -2.02** 
Unemployment (%) 4.28 0.20 6.44 0.25 -2.17 
N 395   486     
Notes: Hourly wages are shown in 2002 Canadian dollars; Asterisks indicate where group 
differences are statistically significant using a two-tailed t-test; * p<0.5  ** p<0.01 
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Supplementary Table 2 Composition Treatment and Control Groups over time 
    
Quebec 
Mothers 
Ontario 
Mothers Difference 
  M SD M SD   
2003 
Years of education 14.31 3.17 14.73 2.81 -0.42* 
Years of work experience 8.00 5.90 8.41 6.10 -0.41 
Average Age 31.56 5.53 33.00 5.62 -1.44** 
Number of children 1.93 0.91 2.01 0.93 -0.07 
2004 
Years of education 14.47 3.22 14.95 2.88 -0.48* 
Years of work experience 7.90 5.90 8.56 5.89 -0.66 
Average Age 31.60 5.48 33.19 5.53 -1.59** 
Number of children 1.93 0.91 1.98 0.89 -0.05 
2005 
Years of education 14.14 2.71 14.62 2.67 -0.48** 
Years of work experience 8.29 5.60 8.34 6.13 -0.05 
Average Age 32.09 5.51 33.46 5.45 -1.37** 
Number of children 1.89 0.88 2.01 0.90 -0.12* 
2007 
Years of education 14.59 2.60 15.02 2.86 -0.43 
Years of work experience 6.87 4.74 7.78 5.27 -0.91 
Average Age 29.85 4.63 31.88 5.01 -2.03** 
Number of children 1.74 0.87 1.91 0.90 -0.17 
2008 
Years of education 14.08 2.54 14.73 2.63 -0.65** 
Years of work experience 6.89 4.89 7.57 5.33 -0.68 
Average Age 30.75 4.99 31.88 5.18 -1.13** 
Number of children 1.79 0.82 1.91 0.87 -0.12 
2009 
Years of education 14.25 2.58 14.93 2.58 -0.68** 
Years of work experience 7.22 5.00 7.87 5.49 -0.65 
Average Age 31.39 5.33 32.48 5.27 -1.09** 
Number of children 1.82 0.04 1.98 0.93 -0.16* 
2010 
Years of education 14.26 2.64 14.82 2.64 -0.56** 
Years of work experience 8.18 5.21 8.42 5.68 -0.24 
Average Age 32.05 5.44 33.10 5.36 -1.05** 
Number of children 1.85 0.84 1.97 0.87 -0.11 
2011 
Years of education 14.27 2.72 15.19 2.63 -0.92** 
Years of work experience 8.81 5.47 8.41 5.68 0.4 
Average Age 32.76 5.28 33.67 5.29 -0.92* 
Number of children 1.95 0.88 2.01 0.92 -0.06 
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Robustness checks and alternative treatment groups 
In an additional robustness check, we return to the concern that differential effects of Great 
Recession on Quebec and Ontario may be driving our results for labor force participation, full-
time and part-time employment and unemployment. If, indeed our results were an artifact of the 
recession, we would expect to find similar results for other groups, with effects concentrated in 
2008 and 2009. To analyze whether this is the case we run our Model 3 specification using fathers 
of young children as our treatment group. As shown in Supplementary Table 3, we find no such 
effects. We do find that fathers exposed to the policy were nine percentage points less likely to 
work full-time in 2007, perhaps indicating that the policy may have been successful in reducing 
gendered household specialization among fathers. However, this effect dissipates and becomes 
statistically non-significant in subsequent years.  
Supplementary Table 3: Test for recession effect on fathers of young children 
  
Labor force 
participation 
Full-time 
employment 
Part-time 
employment 
Unemploy-
ment 
(ln) Hourly 
wages 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Quebec 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.07** 0.02 
DiD 2007 0.01 0.03 -0.09* 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 
DiD 2008 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.00 0.04 
DiD 2009 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
DiD 2010 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 
DiD 2011 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03 
R2 0.17  0.15  0.13  0.03  0.35  
N 6,352   5,680   5,542   5,185   4,971   
Note: Models include full year dummies and controls for age, age-squared and number of children, 
years of education and years of work experience; * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
Because father’s human capital and occupational characteristics are likely to influence household 
specialization as well as mothers’ characteristics, we run our Model 2 specifications controlling 
for fathers’ years of education, employment status and occupational class. Years of education is a 
continuous variable indicating the number of years of schooling a respondent’s partner completed. 
Partners’ employment status is a categorical variable where 0 indicates that an individual is out of 
the labor force, 1 indicates full-time employment, 2 indicates part-time employment and 3 
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indicates unemployment.  Finally, occupational class is a 10-cateogry variable derived from the 
2001 National Occupational Class scheme. Occupational categories include:  
1 "Management Occupations" 
2 "Business, Finance and Administrative Occupations" 
3 "Natural and Applied Sciences and Related Occupations" 
4 "Health Occupations" 
5 "Occupations in Social Science, Education, Government Service and Religion" 
6 "Occupations in Art, Culture, Recreation and Sport" 
7 "Sales and Service Occupations" 
8 "Trades, Transport and Equipment Operators and Related Occupations" 
9 "Occupations Unique to Primary Industry"  
10 "Occupations Unique to Processing, Manufacturing and Utilities" 
The results from these models, presented in Supplementary Table 4, are largely unchanged from 
our main results in magnitude and statistical significance. We find that, controlling for mothers’ 
and fathers’ characteristics, mothers exposed to QPIP are 4 percentage points more likely to be in 
the labor force, 5 percentage points more likely to be employed full-time, 6 percentage points more 
likely to be employed part-time and 4 percentage points less likely to be unemployed. Our DiD 
estimate for labor force participation is no longer statistically significant, however, likely reflecting 
the loss of precision resulting from the loss of 850 observations due to missing partner data.  
Supplementary Table 4: Model 2 specifications controlling for Fathers’ education, employment 
status and occupational class (NOC) 
  
Labor force 
participation 
Full-time 
employment 
Part-time	
employment	
Unemploy-
ment 
Hourly wages 
  B SE B B SE B B	 SE	B	 B SE B B SE B 
DiD  0.04 0.02 0.05* 0.03 -0.06* 0.03 -0.04* 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Quebec 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.05** 0.02 
Post 2006 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.02 
N 5600 4651 4517 4109 4102 
Note: Controls include full year dummies, age, age-squared and number of children years of 
education, years of work experience, partner’s years education, partner’s employment status and 
partner’s occupational class (NOC 2001); * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Because parental responsibilities and factors like childcare use and availability differ by age of 
child, QPIP’s effect on mothers’ labor market outcomes may differ as children grow older. To 
assess this possibility, we use Model 2 to estimate the effects of the policy among several age-
range subsamples of our treatment and control groups. First, we drop mothers of 5-year olds from 
the model as kindergarten is universally available (although not mandatory) in Quebec from age 
5. The results, presented in Supplementary Table 5, vary little from our main Model 2 findings 
although the coefficient on hourly wages is slightly larger at 0.06 and statistically significant where 
it was 0.04 and non-significant in our main specifications. 
Supplementary Table 5 Impact of QPIP on Mothers’ Labor Market Outcomes, Model2, dropping 
mothers of 5-year olds  
  
Labor force 
participation 
Full-time 
employment 
Part-time 
employment 
(ln) Hourly 
wages 
Unemployment 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD 0.06* 0.02 0.06* 0.03 -0.06* 0.03 0.06* 0.02 -0.05** 0.02 
Quebec 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.07** 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Post 2006 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.06* 0.03 -0.00 0.02 
N 5951   4910   4746   4330   4297   
Note: Models 2 include full year dummies and controls for age, age-squared, number of children, 
years of education and years work experience;  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01. 
 
Next, we run model two for a sample of mothers of 1-2 year olds throughout the period of analysis 
and then for mothers of 3-4 year olds. As shown in Supplementary Table 6 - 7, our results are 
qualitatively similar to our main findings. For mothers of 1-2 year olds, the magnitudes of effects 
are broadly similar but standard errors are larger in several instances, reflecting the substantially 
reduced sample size. For mothers of 3-4 year olds, the magnitudes of effects are smaller than our 
main results and non-significant however it is important to note that the post period in this 
specification can only be drawn from 2010 and 2011 and therefore post year sample sizes are 
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small. That said, the direction of effects for this group are in line with our expectations and main 
results.  
 
Supplementary Table 6 Impact of QPIP on Mothers’ Labor Market Outcomes, Model2, mothers 
of 1-2 year olds  
  
Labor force 
participation 
Full-time 
employment 
Part-time 
employment 
(ln) Hourly 
wages 
Unemployment 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
DiD 0.06* 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.07* 0.03 -0.08** 0.03 
Quebec 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.08** 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Post 2006 -0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07* 0.03 
N 3330   2703   2614   2391   2348   
Note: Models 2 include full year dummies and controls for age, age-squared, number of children, 
years of education and years work experience;  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01. 
 
Supplementary Table 7 Impact of QPIP on Mothers’ Labor Market Outcomes, Model2, mothers 
of 3-4 year olds  
  
Labor force 
participation 
Full-time 
employment 
Part-time 
employment 
(ln) Hourly 
wages 
Unemployment 
 
B SE B B SE B B 
SE 
B 
B SE B B SE B 
DiD 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.03 
Quebec 0.02 0.02 0.05* 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.06** 0.02 -0.00 0.02 
Post 2006 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 
N 2372   1991   1922   1703   1792   
Note: Models 2 include full year dummies and controls for age, age-squared, number of children, 
years of education and years work experience;  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01. 
 
Finally, we run our Model 2 specifications on a sample of treated and control group mothers of 
children age 0-5 years old in each year of analysis as opposed to our main specifications in which 
the sample definition changes by age of youngest child in each post year. The results (shown in 
Supplementary Table 8) are largely consistent with our main findings although the magnitude of 
coefficients is smaller for some outcomes than in our main specifications. This is unsurprising, 
however, considering that in post years our treatment group is “diluted” with Quebec mothers 
whose children were born prior to 2006 and were therefore not eligible for the policy.  
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Supplementary Table 8 Impact of QPIP on Mothers’ Labor Market Outcomes, Model2, mothers 
of 0-5 year olds (consistent sample definition in each year)  
  
Labor force 
participation 
Full-time 
employment 
Part-time 
employment 
(ln) Hourly 
wages 
Unemployment 
 
B SE B B SE B B 
SE 
B 
B SE B B SE B 
DiD 0.04* 0.02 0.05* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 0.05* 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
Quebec 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.06** 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Post 2006 0.02 0.02 -0.05* 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.07** 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 
N 7694   6343   6122   5534     5588 
Note: Models 2 include full year dummies and controls for age, age-squared, number of children, 
years of education and years work experience;  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01. 
 
 
